报告一：Lying for Efficiency or Fairness?

报 告 人：Jaimie Wei-Hung Lien（连暐虹）教授

报告时间：2025年7月2日 14:30-15:30

报告地点：成都校区博学楼B401

报告人简介：Jaimie Wei-Hung Lien（连暐虹），山东大学经济研究院教授、博士生导师；山东大学特聘教授、国家自然科学基金委外籍优青；山东大学理论与实验经济学研究中心（CREATE）联席主任。美国卫尔斯利女子学院学士，美国加利福尼亚大学圣地亚哥分校硕士、博士。担任North American Journal of Economics and Finance、Scientific Reports、International Journal of Finance and Economics等多份国际学术期刊客座编辑与编委成员，担任大陆、香港、台湾、新加坡等政府科研资助机构评审专家，担任多所高校教师晋升外审专家，担任31种期刊匿名评审人，多次获评杰出评审人。研究领域包括行为经济学、实验经济学、应用微观经济学，研究主题涉及合作互惠、参照依赖、现时偏误、代表性偏误等重要行为现象。先后主持过国家自然科学基金项目、教育部科研项目、香港研究资助局项目。目前已有论文发表于Nature Communications、PNAS、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Economic Journal、Games and Economic Behavior等国际知名期刊。曾获"中国信息经济学2016青年创新奖"、"中国信息经济学2018青年创新奖"和"中国信息经济学2011-2015理论贡献奖"。

报告内容摘要：A relationship between lying behavior and social preferences has often been proposed in explaining patterns of lying aversion. However, studies have seldom directly examined the relationship between different types of social preferences and the corresponding lying behaviors. We assess individuals’ preferences over social allocations along with their lying tendencies in the analogous scenarios, using a novel multinomial version of a ‘mind cheating game’, which allows different degrees of lying and is independent of social image and reputation concerns. Our study allows us to observe how preferences over fairness and efficiency are associated with the willingness to lie for one’s self and others. Selfish and spiteful lies are prevalent among those with strong spiteful preferences in the allocation task, while those subjects with efficiency-oriented preferences tend to tell efficient lies on behalf of others. However, among those with a strong preference for fairness in allocations, lying on behalf of fairness concerns is less apparent. Altogether, the empirical patterns suggest that individuals with a strong preference for efficiency are more likely to lie for fairness concerns, while those with a strong fairness preference may be more likely to lie out of self-interest.

报告二：Competing under Uncertainty: Building or Breaking Moral Behavior？

报 告 人：郑捷教授

报告时间：2025年7月2日 15:30-16:30

报告地点：成都校区博学楼B401

报告人简介：郑捷，山东大学经济研究院教授、博士生导师；山东省“泰山学者计划”特聘专家，入选国家重大人才工程；山东大学理论与实验经济学研究中心（CREATE）主任。清华大学经济学学士、硕士，美国华盛顿大学经济学硕士、博士。国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副主编，担任多份SSCI/SCI期刊客座主编。研究领域包括信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学、产业经济学，主持过多项国家自然科学基金项目（结题连续获“特优”评价），并多次在学术会议上做主旨演讲与专题报告。研究工作发表于《经济研究》、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等国内外经济学、管理学、自然科学各领域的知名期刊。担任中国信息经济学会常务理事、中国运筹学会博弈论分会常务理事、中国行为与实验经济学论坛联合秘书长、中国微观经济理论论坛学术委员会委员、中国经济学年会微观理论与行为经济专业委员会委员等学术职务。

报告内容摘要：Both uncertainty and competition are prevalent in real-world contexts, especially during economic downturns or periods of resource scarcity. While prior research has often examined these factors in isolation, few studies have explored how they interact to shape moral behavior. This study investigates the joint effects of uncertainty and competition on moral decision-making, with a particular focus on dishonesty. We conducted a two-stage laboratory experiment using a 2×2 between-subjects design to distinguish between absolute and relative uncertainty in competitive and non-competitive contexts. Our findings reveal widespread dishonest reporting across all treatments, with competition significantly amplifying dishonest behavior. Additionally, we find that uncertainty’s “moral karma” effect is conditional—promoting honesty only in the absence of competition. Contrary to predictions based on second-order moral reasoning, relative uncertainty does not enhance relatively more moral behavior. These results suggest that moral decision-making under uncertainty is strategic but short-sighted, driven more by immediate competitive pressures than by abstract or long-term ethical considerations.

主办单位：经济管理学院

MBA教育中心

人文社会科学处

能源安全与低碳发展重点实验室

四川石油天然气发展研究中心